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Abstract
An n-person Bargaining Problem consists of a pair (5, d) where S C Rn is a set of feasible
utility vectors which the players may obtain through cooperation, and the point d E 5,
called the disagreement -point, is interpreted as the utility that players receive if they fail
to reach an agreement. Given a class of bargaining problems, En
,
a solution is a map that
associates with each problem (S,d) in Sn a unique point in 5. In this paper, we relax the
common assumption that S is convex and examine the implications for well known solution
concepts. We argue that even with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, this restriction
is substantive and limits the application of the theory. Without convexity, the solution
introduced by Nash(1950) is no longer well defined. We propose a new solution called the
Nash Extension. This solution coincides with the Nash solution when S is convex and is
the unique solution satisfying weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, conti-
nuity, and a new axiom, ethical monotonicity. We explore the relationship between ethical
monotonicity and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives. The solution introduced
by Kalai and Smorodinsky(1975) remains well defined on our domain and the characteri-
zation of the solution provided in their paper can be obtained without the assumption of
convexity of S. Similarly, the Egalitarian solution is well defined on our domain and the
characterization provided by Kalai(1977) does not require the convexity of S.
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1. Introduction
An n-person bargaining problem consists of a pair (S, d) where 5 is a non-empty subset
ofRn
,
and d G S. The set S is interpreted as the set of utility allocations that are attainable
through joint action on the part of all n agents. If the agents fail to reach an agreement,
then the problem is settled at the point <i, which is called the disagreement point. A
bargaining solution F, defined on a class of problems Sn
,
is a map that associates with
each problem (5, d) £ Sn a unique point in 5. In the axiomatic approach to bargaining
we start by specifying a list of properties (Pareto optimality, for example) that we would
like a solution to have. If it can be shown that there is a unique solution that satisfies a
given list of axioms, then the solution is said to be characterized this list.
It is common to restrict the domain to problems with convex feasible sets. However,
bargaining problems can arise from a variety of political, social and economic situations.
The requirement that S be convex seems to remove many important cases from considera-
tion. For example, the image in utility space of a finite set of resource allocations will be a
finite set of points, not a convex set. Or consider the bargaining problem associated with
an economy in which strong externalities are present. It is quite likely that the feasible set
of such a problem will be non-convex.
This restriction of domain is often justified by assuming that agents' preferences can
be represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Feasible sets may then be
convexified by running lotteries over the original elements. It is claimed that since agents
care only about the expected utility of settlements, these random allocations just as good
as the non-random ones. Restricting attention to bargaining problems with convex feasible
sets, therefore, has no economic consequences other than those associated with the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms on agents' preferences.
We disagree with this conclusion. We argue that the use of lotteries prevents us from
applying axiomatic bargaining theory to a large class of interesting problems.
For example, one common way of using bargaining theory in a cooperative context is
as a method of prescribing settlements to social distribution problems that are "fair" or
"ethical". Under this interpretation, the axioms that characterize the solution employed
are equivalent to a description of the ethical values of the society. We run into difficulties,
however, when a solution recommends that a problem be settled at an utility allocation
attainable only through a lottery. This is because agents do not walk away from the
bargaining table with lotteries in their pockets, they walk away with outcomes of lotteries.
We must therefore choose whether the fairness test is to be applied to expected utility
allocations or to actual utility allocations. This might be viewed as a choice between
fairness of opportunity and fairness of result. 1 Allowing problems to be settled at lotteries
is the same as deciding that outcomes don't matter. In many situations, this maybe
inappropriate and restrictive.
Take the case of an "egalitarian" society in which two identical free agents toss a
fair coin to decide who is to be slave to the other as an illustration. Each may prefer the
gamble to the status quo of both agents being free. So before the coin is tossed, the gamble
represents an individually rational, Pareto optimal, and in particular, equal division of the
surplus. However, the agent who ends up being the slave is substantially worse off than the
agent who becomes the slave holder. One would be hard pressed to argue that this is an
egalitarian society after the lottery is held. One would be even harder pressed to convince
the slave to accept his fate as "fair", and as the inevitable result of his egalitarian beliefs. 2
The axiomatic approach has also been applied to non-cooperative bargaining games.
Labor disputes, for example, may be interpreted as unanimity games in which all agents
must agree to a division of the jointly produced surplus or gain nothing. Such games may
have many Nash equilibria and axiomatic methods give us a sensible way of selecting a
single outcome.
One interesting way to use bargaining theory in this situation is to imagine a mediator
attempting to settle a labor dispute. Mediation is predicated on the belief that if agents are
persuaded that a particular division is "fair" , then they will voluntarily agree to coordinate
their actions and accept the allocation as a settlement to their problem. Thus, the axioms
We thank Charles Kahn for this suggestion.
A similar point is argued by Myerson(1981)
summarize what the mediator believes the agents are likely to accept as fair.
Alternatively, we could view the theory as being purely predictive in nature. The
axioms are then interpreted as statements about the behavior of rational agents given the
institutional framework. For example, we might believe that rational agents will never
settle at a point that is not Pareto optimal or individually rational.
Now consider both of these non-cooperative interpretations in an institutional setting
that does not include the possibility of signing binding contracts. Then in particular,
agents can not credibly commit to abide by the outcomes of lotteries. [Take the slave game
described above. Recall that after the lottery is held, one player ends up being worse off
than he is at the disagreement point. So regardless of whether individual rationality is
imposed because it is "fair", as in the mediation model, or because it is "rational", as in
the behavioral model, the agent who loses the lottery will surely renege on his agreement
to be a slave if there does not exist a binding contract to hold him. Agents will not
voluntarily accept a settlement that is unfair or irrational, respectively, under these two
interpretations. Therefore, the use of lotteries in the non-cooperative context requires that
binding contracts be part of the institutional structure. 3
In this paper we investigate the behavior of certain solution concepts on a domain
that admits non-convex problems. Our primary contribution is a generalization of the
Nash solution. The Nash solution is not well defined on the domain of non-convex bar-
gaining problems. Maximizing the "welfare function" proposed by Nash, or indeed any
"social welfare function", over a non-convex set will not necessarily yield a unique point. 4
The Nash solution, therefore, does not give a clear recommendation of how to settle some
problems. To overcome this difficulty we suggest and characterize a new solution, called
the Nash Extension. This new solution is well defined on the domain of problems that ad-
mit freely disposable utility, and coincides with the Nash solution on the domain of convex
problems. The axioms employed in the characterization are the same as those employed
Binmore( 1988) forcefully presents a similar argument in the non-cooperative framework, concluding: "Thus
convexity necessarily has to appear as a substantive assumption rather than a near tautology." p51.
It is possible, however, to characterize the Nash solution on the domain on non-convex bargaining problems
where the Nash solution happens to be well defined. See Foster and Vohra (1988)
by Nash, except that Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, or Contraction In-
dependence as it will be called in this paper, is replaced by a new axiom, called Ethical
Monotonicity.
We motivate this axiom in the following way. It is undesirable to settle problems at
allocations attainable only through lotteries. Nevertheless, if agents have von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences, then lotteries must be included in the totality bargaining op-
portunities. So if a solution is to be sensitive to all these opportunities then we should
somehow take into account the convex hull of the original 5. We take the settlement
recommended by a solution for the convex hull of a bargaining problem as a bench mark
allocation. In a sense, this ethical point summarizes all the attainable allocations since it
is the ethically desirable point of the true feasible set (including the inadmissible lotteries)
under the chosen solution concept. Now suppose that we have a problem 5 and a smaller
problem S' that is contained in 5. Then we say that the two problems are ethically similar
if the ethical point of the larger one is an element of the convex hull of the smaller, and
the two problems have the same disagreement point. Ethical monotonicity says that if two
problems are ethically similar, then no agent should benefit from this decrease in oppor-
tunities from S to S'. Similarly, no agent should be hurt by an expansion of opportunities
if the expanded problem is ethical comparable to the original problem.
A secondary contribution of this paper is to show that convexity is not required for
the characterizations of the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions provided by Kalai
(1977) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), if utility is assumed to be freely disposable. The
paper concludes by suggesting how the methods used can be extended to other solution
concepts and to other domains.
2. Definitions and Axioms
We start with some definitions and formal statements of the axioms used in the char-
acterizations. Given a point d £ Rn
,
and a set S C Rn , we say S is d- comprehensive if
d < x <y and y £ S implies x £ S. 5
The comprehensive hull of a set S C Rn , with respect to a point d £ Rn is the smallest
d-comprehensive set containing S:
comp(S; d) = {x £ Rn | x £ S or 3 y £ 5 such that d < x < y}. (1)
The convex hull of a set S cRn is the smallest convex set containing S:
n+l n+l
i=\ i=l
t(S) = < x £ Rn | x = y^ aiyi for some a,- > 0, 2. <*,- = ! and y,- € 51 V 2 > . (2)
The convex and comprehensive hull of a set S C Rn , with respect to a point d £ Rn is the
smallest convex, d-comprehensive set containing 5:
concomp(S; d) = con{comp{S\ d)). (3)
Let C denote the space of compact subsets of Rn . The Hausdorff distance p : C x C —» R
is defined by,
p(S, S') = < max maxmm || x — y || ; max mm \\ x — y
]}
(4)
where • is the Euclidean norm. An closed e-ball around x is defined as:
The vector inequalities are represented by >, >,and ^>.
B
€
(x) = {z G Rn | || x - z || < e} (5)
Let int(S) denote the interior of 5, and d(S) the boundary of 5. Define the tyeaA: Pareto
frontier of 5 as:
W\P(S) = {x e 5
I
y > x implies y 5}. (6)
Define the strong Pareto frontier of 5 as:
P(S) = {x e S\y>x implies y £ 5}. (7)
The domain of bargaining problems considered in this paper is £". This is defined as
the class of pairs (5, d) where S C Rn and d G Rn such that:
Al) S is compact.
A2) 5 is d-comprehensive.
A3) There exists x G S and x ^> d.
This differs from the usual domain, which we denote S"on , in that we do not assume that
the set of feasible utility allocations is convex. A bargaining solution, F, is a function from
£? to Rn such that for each (S,d) G E£, F(S,d) G 5.
A list of axioms that will be used to characterize the solutions discussed in this paper
follows. Readers familiar with axiomatic bargaining theory may wish to skip to the defi-
nition of Ethical Monotonicity. All bargaining problems mentioned below are assumed to
be elements of £".
Weak Pareto- Optimality (W. P.O.): F(S,d) G WP(S).
Contraction Independence (C.IND) 6 : If S' C S, d' = d, and F(S,d) G 5', then F(S',d') =
F(S,d).
C.IND was introduced by Nash(1950) with the label "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives".
A permutation operator, 7r, is a bijection from {1, 2, . .
.
, n] to {1, 2, . .
.
, n}. II n is the class
of all such operators. Let n(x) = {x^ l\x n ^ 2\ . . . ,x 7r ( n) ). 7 and ic(S) = {y G Rn | y =
7r(x),x E 5}.
Symmetry (SYM): If for all permutation operators 7r G II n , 7r(S) = 5 and 7r(d) = d, then
F l (S,d) = F'(S,d)Vz,;.
An affine transformation on Rn is a map, A : Rn —> Rn , where A(x) = a + bx for some
a G Rn ,6 G R++- A n is the class of all such transformations. Let A(5) = {y E Rn | y =
A(x),x G S}.
>
Sca/e Invariance (S.INV): V A G An , F(A(S),A(d)) = A(F(S,d)).
Translation Invariance (T.INV): V x G Rn , F(S + {x}, d + x) = F(S, d) + x.
Continuity (CONT): For all sequences {(5",d)}~ l5 if p(S,S") -> 0, then F(S",d) -*
F(S,d).
Strong Monotonicity (S.MON): If 5 C 5' and d = d', then F(S',d') > F(S,d).
The /dea/ Point of a problem (S,d) is defined as:
a(5, d) = (max x 1
,
max x 2
,
. . .
,
maxx n ). (S)
x€S xgS x€S
x>d x>d x>d
Restricted Monotonicity (R.MON): If 5 C 5', d = d', and a(S,d) = a(S',d'), then
F(S',<f) >F(5,d)-
The Ethical Point with respect to F of a problem (5, d), is defined as:
e
F (S,d) = F(con(S),d). (9)
Now Ethical Monotonicity is formally defined:
£*/nca/ Monotonicity (E.MON): If 5' C 5, d' = d, and e F (S,d) G con(S'), then F(5,d) >
F(S',d').
Although this new axiom is a monotonicity requirement, it turns out that Ethical
Monotonicity with Pareto Optimality implies Contraction Independence on the convex
Superscripts stand for the components of a vector
domain. On the domain of comprehensive problems, there is no logical relation between
the two axioms.
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3. The Solutions
In his 1950 paper, Nash considers the domain £"on °f convex problems. He proposes
the following solution:
N(S,d) = I argmax f[(xi - rf,-) I , (10)
and demonstrates that it is the only solution that satisfies W.P.O, SYM, S.INV, and
C.IND. On the domain E", however, the mapping N fails to be a solution as defined the
introduction. This is because N will not be single-valued on £" in general. A natural sug-
gestion would be to define a new solution by taking a selection from the set of maximizers
of the Nash product. Unfortunately, it is impossible to do this in a way that satisfies
the properties enjoyed by N on the convex domain. Obviously, no such selection satisfies
SYM. Additionally, it can be shown that any such selection must also fail to satisfy the
axioms CONT and C.IND.
To remedy this deficiency we propose a new solution, the Nash Extension, which is
constructed as follows. First define the mapping L : E£ —> Rn as:
L(S,d) = con(N(con(S),d),dY (11)
L(S,d) is the line segment connecting the disagreement point cf, to the
Nash solution of the problem composed of the convex hull of 5, and d. Now we define
the solution NE:
NE(S,d)= imaxx
|
x G L(S,d)f)s\
, (12)
where max indicates the maximal element with respect to the partial order on R n . The
construction of NE is illustrated figure 1. The point NE(S,d) is the intersection of the
weak Pareto frontier of S and the line segment connecting the disagreement point and
Ethical Point under the Nash solution the problem (S,d). Obviously, NE coincides with
TV on the domain of convex problems.
N(con(S),d) = ethical point
Figure 1: The Nash extension solution
Nash wrote that the minimal standard that any solution to a bargaining problem
ought to meet is that it be single valued and continuous. We pause to show that the
Nash Extension meets both of these requirements. To see that the iVE solution is single
valued, notice that L is a non-empty, compact-valued correspondence. Then since L is also
a line segment, its maximal element exists and is unique. Thus, NE is non-empty and
single- valued on S". We now prove that it is continuous.
Lemma 1. NE is continuous on S™.
Proof/
Let S" —* S . We begin by showing that con is a /^-continuous correspondence. To see
this, suppose that for any given t > 0, p(S,S') < e. Then for any ij = ^?=i °'' T « € con(S)
there is a. y' = Y^?=i a *x 'i ^ con(S') such that y 6 B( (y'). By reversing the argument, we
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also find that for any y' G con(S') there is a y E con(S) such that y' G B e (y). Thus if
p(S,S') < e then p(con(S), con(S')) < e, and so con is p-continuous.
Therefore, since con is continuous, and N is continuous on X)con> ^he composition
map e^, where eN (S,d) = N(con(S),d), is continuous by Hildenbrand(1974) proposition
B.7. We conclude that if Sv -* 5, then eN(S",d) -» eN (5,c?).
By Definition, NE(S,d) G £(5,<i). So NE(S,d) = (1 - A*)d + A*eN (S,d) for some
A* G [0,1]. Also, for each S", NE(S",d) = (1 - A")d + X v eN {Sv 1 c?) for some A" G [0,1].
Notice that the sequence {A"} is drawn from the compact set [0,1]. Thus, given any
sequence of sets {S"} converging to S, if it can be shown for every convergent subsequence
{A"*} of {A"} that A"* —» A* then the lemma is proven. Suppose not. Then there are two
cases:
1. Suppose first that for some subsequence {S l/k }, A" fc —* A and A > A*. Then the
definition of NE implies (l-\)d+\eN (S,d) = x^S. Thus the sequence {NE(SUk )}
converges to a point not S, contradicting the hypothesis S Uk —> S.
2. Now suDpose that for some subsequence {S Uk } that \ Uk —> A and A < A*. Then
(1 — \)d + \eN (S,d) = x <C NE(S,d). Additionally, the existence of a point S that
strictly dominates d implies that d <C x. Hence by the d-comprehensiveness of S,
x G int(S). Thus there exists e > and v\ such that for v > i/\, B t (x) C S Uk and
NE{S,d) $. B t (x). Since eN (S Uk ,d) —» eN (S,d), there exists 1/2 such that 1/ > i/2
implies L(S Uk ,d) n B
€
(z) ^ 0. Now, for each 1/* let y"* = max{L(S Vk ,d) n £
€(£)}.
Let i/' = max{v l ,v2 }. Clearly for vk > v\ y"k exists and yVk G dB€ (x) n 5"*.
However, by hypothesis NE(S" k ,d) —* x , so there exists 1/" such that i/* > z/' implies
NE(S Uk ,d) G tnt(Be (x)). Then for i/4 > max{i/>"}, we have y Uk G 5"fc n L(S"k ,d)
and ?/'/fc > NE(S" k ,d), contradicting the definition of NE.
Hence for every subsequence of 5", we have that A = A*. Therefore, x = NE(S,d).
Our main result is a characterization of the new solution NE.
Theorem 1. A solution on EJ? satisfies W.P.O, S.V, SYM, E.MON, and CONT if and
only if it is the Nash extension.
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Proof/
(a) First it is shown that the NE solution satisfies the axioms.
W.P.O: Let x = NE(S,d). Assume there exists y £ 5 such that y ^> x. Then since S
is d-comprehensive there exists z G L(S,d) D S such that z ^> x. However, this
contradicts the hypothesis x = NE(S,d).
S.INV: Let (S, <f) £ E™ and A E An be any affine transformation. Since con(X(S)) =
A(con(S)), and N satisfies S.INV on S"on , we conclude that Ar(A(con(5)), A(d)) =
A(JV(con(SV)). ThusL(A(S),A(d)) = X(L(S,d)). Therefore, max{L(A(S),A(d))
fl A(5)} = max {A(L(5,<f) (1 S)} = A(A/\E(S,<i)), as required.
SYM: Let (5, d) be a symmetric problem. Then (con(S), d) is also a symmetric problem.
Since N satisfies SYM on E£on , N(con(S),d) is a point of equal coordinates. But
so is d, and so all elements L(5, d) are points of equal coordinates. Consequently,
NE(S,d) £ L(S,d) is symmetric.
E.MON: Let (S,ef), (S',<f) be such that; 5c5',(f = (i' and eNE(S',d') e con(S). Then
A^(con(5'),^') = NE(con(S'),d') = eNE(S',d'), and therefore N(con(S'),d') £
con(S). Since con(5) C con(S'), and A" satisfies C.IND on S"on , N(con(S),d) =
AT(con(S'),d'). Furthermore since d = d! by hypothesis, L(S,d) = L(S' ,d').
Therefore S C 5' implies NE(S,d) < NE(S',d'), as required.
CONT: See lemma 1.
(b) Conversely let F be a solution on S" satisfying the five axioms, and consider any
problem (S,d). By S.INV, we can set d = and N(con(S),d) = (1,1,..., 1) = e.
Then NE(S, d) = (a, . . . ,a) = x for some a > 0. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1) 5C R^.
Let the sets T and V be defined as follows,
T = concomp[(n, 0, . .
.
, 0), (0, n, . . . , 0), (0, . .
.
, n); d] (13)
V = T\{x + Rl+ }. (14)
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Since e = N(con(S),d), the hyperplane defined by Y17=i Xi ~ n suPPorts con(S) at e.
Hence S C T. Also, since F satisfies W.P.O, and S is comprehensive, z G {x + R-++}
implies that z £ S. Thus SC7.
Now, since (V,0) is a symmetric problem, and x is the only symmetric point in
WP{V), by W.P.O. and SYM, F{V, d) = x. Also, since e is the only symmetric point
in WP(T), by W.P.O. and SYM, F(T,d) = e. But con(V) = T, and so e F (V,d) = e.
Therefore, since S C V and eF (V, d) = e G con(S), by E.MON, F(5, d) < F(V, d) = x.
There are two possibilities,
i) x E P(S). Then by W.P.O, F(S,d) = x = NE(S,d) and the proof is complete.
ii) x £ P{S). Then consider the sequence of problems {(V
r
'/
;0)} and {(5";0)} defined
by:
V = <V[_jcomp
S" = < S I) comp
1 „ In «
-e + (l- -)x;0 (15)
-e + (l--)z;0 (16)
SinceV is symmetric and d = 0, by W.P.O. and SYM, F(V,0) = (<*+£, ...,<*+£) =
x
u
. Since 5" C V", eF(V u ,0) = e and e € con(S"), by E.MON and W.P.O. we have
F(S",d) = F(V,d) = xv . But since S" -» S, by CONT F(5",d) -> F(5,d). Thus
since xv — x, we conclude that F(5, d, ) = x = NE(S, d).
Case 2) S<£ R£.
Let V = {^(jTren" 7r (^')}- Since V is symmetric, and 2 G WP(V'), we can replace
(V, 0) above with (V,0) and replicate argument given for Case 1. •
Kalai(1977) examines the properties of an alternative to the Nash solution called the
egalitarian solution. Although idea of dividing surpluses equally is not new, Kalai was the
first to present an axiomatic characterization of this solution. Formally, let us define the
egalitarian solution, E, as:
13
E(S,d) = {max[x
€
S \ x { - d{ =Xj-djVi,j G (l,...n)]}. (17)
The axioms we use here are the same as those employed by Kalai to characterize
the solution E on the domain of convex bargaining problems. Further properties of the
egalitarian solution are discussed Kalai(1977) and Thomson (1986).
Theorem 2. A solution F on E? satisfies SYM, T.INV, W.P.O, and S.MON if and only
if it is the egalitarian solution.
Proof/
The proof that E satisfies the four axioms is elementary and is omitted. Conversely let
F be a solution satisfying the four axioms. Given any (5, d) £ E™, we can assume by T.INV
that the problem has been normalized such that d = 0. Thus E(S, d) = (a, . .
.
, a) = x for
some a > 0. Now let T be defined by:
T = comp(x;0), (18)
and consider the problem (T, 0). Since T is symmetric, d = 0, and x is the only symmetric
element of WP(T), by W.P.O. and SYM, F(T,d) = x. Also, since S is comprehensive
TCS. Hence, by S.MON, F(S,d) > x.
By assumption, S is compact. Thus, there exists (3 E R such that x £ S implies ( — /?,
— /?, . .
.
,
— (3) < (a; 1 ,!
2
,
. . . ,x
n
) < (/?,/?, . . . , /?). Let Z be the symmetric closed hypercube
defined by:
Z={y<ER"| |y| < (/?,/?, . .
.
,/?)}. (19)
Also define T' as:
T' = Z\{x + R£+ }. (20)
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Consider the problem (T';0). Since T' is symmetric, d = and x is the only symmetric
element of WP(V), by W.P.O. and SYM, F(T',d) = x. But since S C T', by S.MON,
F(S, d) < x. Thus, F(5, d) = x = E(S, d). •
The next solution considered is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, K:
(5, d) = max [x E 5 | x E con(a(5, d), d)]
.
(21)
The axioms used are those employed by Kalai and Smorodinsky(1975) to characterize
K on the convex domain with two agents, except that only weak Pareto optimality is
used. The generalization to more agents is not immediate since K does not satisfy even
Weak Pareto Optimality on £"on for n > 2. No such problem exists on the comprehensive
domain. For further discussion see Kalai and Smorodinsky(1975) and Thomson(1986).
Theorem 3. A solution F on H? satisfies SYM, S.INV, W.P.O, and R.MON if and only
if it is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Proof/
The proof that K satisfies the axioms is elementary and is omitted. Conversely let F
be a solution satisfying the four axioms. Given any (S,d) E £", assume by S.INV that
the problem has been normalized such that d = and a(S,d) = (/?,...,/?) = y. Then
A' (5, d) = (a, . .
.
, a) = x for some a > 0. Let T be defined as:
r = comp(y;0)\{x + R£+ } (22)
and consider the problem (T, 0). We distinguish two cases:
Case i) S C R+. Since S is comprehensive and x E WP(S), we have S C T. Also, since T
is symmetric, d = 0, and x is the only symmetric element WP{T), by W.P.O. and
SYM, F(T,0) = x. However, since 5 C T, and a(5,0) = a(T,0) = y, by R.MON
F(5,0) <F(T,0) =z
Now let T' be defined by,
15
T =comji[09
v 0,...,0)> (0,A... f 0)f 0,...^)9 x;0]. (23)
Consider the problem (T", 0). Since T is symmetric, d = 0, and x is the only symmetric
element in WP(T'), then by W.P.O. and SYM, F(T',0) = x. Also, since T'cS and
a(S,d) = a(T',0) = y, by R.MON, F(5,d) > F(T',d) = x. Thus F(5,d) = x =
K{S,d).
Case ii) 5 <£ R" • Let V be defined as follows,
In-en J
Note that V is symmetric and S C V. If we replace
(T, 0) the previous argument with (V,0) the proof goes through as before. •
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4. Conclusion
Since Nash's pioneering treatment of the bargaining problem, most authors have main-
tained the assumption of convexity of the feasible set. In this paper we have dispensed with
convexity. We proposed a new solution, the Nash Extension, and demonstrated that it re-
tains several of the desirable features of the Nash solution on the domain of comprehensive
problems, while coinciding with the Nash solution when the problem is convex.
Our main result is a characterization of the new solution, employing a new axiom,
Ethical Monotonicity. Additionally we demonstrate that axiomatic characterizations of
several well known solutions can be extended to the domain of problems that are merely
comprehensive. This does not seem to be a very strong restriction on the domain since it
is implied by an assumption of freely disposable utility.
This work suggests that the assumption of a convex feasible set is not essential for any
Monotone Path Solution. Since any Monotone Path Solution is well-defined on the domain
of comprehensive problems any characterization found on the domain of convex problems
should be easy to adapt. This class of solutions is discussed and axiomatized Thomson
(19S6), pp52-57. A second class of solutions that are well defined on the domain of convex
problems is the class of strictly concave social welfare functions. The Nash solution is the
most widely known of these. The class of solutions represented by an additively separable
social welfare function has recently been axiomatized by Lensberg(1988). It would be of
interest to see if our method of constructing the Nash Extension could be employed to
define a new solution or solution class on the domain of comprehensive problems, which
coincides with the selection of the given social welfare function or class of functions, when
the problem is convex. A characterization could then be attempted using E.MON or some
similar axiom.
We close by remarking that it may also be of interest to study more general domains.
For example, suppose agents cannot necessarily dispose of utility freely, but they can "agree
some of the time and disagree some of the time," then the we have a domain of problems
which the feasible sets are star-shaped with respect to the disagreement point.
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